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Abstract
We study European banks’ demand for short-term funds (liquidity) during the summer 2007
subprime market crisis. We use bidding data from the European Central Bank’s auctions for
one-week loans, their main channel of monetary policy implementation. Our analysis provides
a high-frequency, disaggregated perspective on the 2007 crisis, which was previously studied
through comparisons of collateralized and uncollateralized interbank money market rates which
do not capture the heterogeneous impact of the crisis on individual banks. Through a model of
bidding, we show that banks’ bids reﬂect their cost of obtaining short-term funds elsewhere (e.g.,
in the interbank market) as well as a strategic response to other bidders. The strategic response
is empirically important: while a na¨ ıve interpretation of the raw bidding data may suggest
that virtually all banks suﬀered an increase in the cost of short-term funding, we ﬁnd that for
about one third of the banks, the change in bidding behavior was simply a strategic response.
We also ﬁnd considerable heterogeneity in the short-term funding costs among banks: for over
one third of the bidders, funding costs increased by more than 20 basis points, and funding
costs vary widely with respect to the country-of-origin. Estimated funding costs of banks are
also predictive of market- and accounting-based measures of bank performance, suggesting the
external validity of our ﬁndings.
Keywords: multiunit auctions, primary market, structural estimation, subprime market,
liquidity crisis
JEL Classiﬁcation: D44, E58, G015
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This paper studies European banks’ demand for short-term funds (liquidity) during the summer
2007 subprime market crisis. It uses bidding data from the European Central Bank’s auctions for
one-week loans. The analysis provides a high-frequency, disaggregated perspective on the 2007
crisis, which was previously studied through comparisons of collateralized and uncollateralized
interbank money market rates which do not capture the heterogeneous impact of the crisis on
individual banks.
While yield spreads paint a useful picture of the market-level impact of the liquidity crisis, and
could be used as a “temperature gauge” for assessing the health of credit markets, it is not possible
to assess the heterogeneity of the impact of the crisis across the banking system without access to
information on individual banks’ funding costs. Unfortunately, obtaining high-frequency data on
individual banks’ borrowing costs is diﬃcult, because most interbank transactions take place on an
over-the-counter basis, or through anonymized trading. Bank-level bidding data from ECB’s repo
auctions therefore provide us with a unique opportunity for understanding the distribution of the
severity of the liquidity crisis across the banking sector.
Through a model of bidding, this paper shows that banks’ bids reﬂect their cost of obtaining
short-term funds elsewhere (e.g., in the interbank market) as well as a strategic response to other
bidders. The strategic response is empirically important: while a na¨ ıve interpretation of the raw
bidding data may suggest that virtually all banks suﬀered an increase in the cost of short-term
funding, the paper ﬁnds that for about one third of the banks, the change in bidding behavior
was simply a strategic response. It further documents considerable heterogeneity in the short-term
funding costs among banks: for over one third of the bidders, funding costs increased by more than
20 basis points, and funding costs vary widely with respect to the country-of-origin.
Although “market-based” measures of banks’ ﬁnancial health such as CDS rates and stock
prices are closely monitored by the ECB, the majority of banks in Europe do not have credit-
default swaps traded on their bonds, and/or are not publicly traded themselves. Most of the
information that is available by such non-publicly traded banks is limited to balance sheets that
are disclosed quarterly and sometimes annually. This paper ﬁnds that the estimated marginal
valuations of banks are predictive of several widely used performance measures (such as return-
on-equity). Moreover, this paper ﬁnds that marginal values are much better predictors of these
performance measures than the bids themselves.
Non-technical Summary 6
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1 Introduction
When the subprime credit crisis hit the Euro money market in August 2007, banks’ cost of ob-
taining short-term uncollateralized loans increased sharply.1 In Figure 1, we follow Taylor and
Williams (2008, 2009), and plot the spread between the (1-week) EURIBOR2,am e a s u r eo fi n t e r -
bank uncollateralized rate, and the (1-week) EUREPO, the rate for fully collateralized loans on the
interbank market. After the second week of August 2007, the gap between these rates signiﬁcantly
widened: the premium a lender required for an unsecured loan in the interbank market after August
2007 increased from around 4 basis points to well over 10 basis points for loans with a one-week
maturity.3
In response to similar liquidity problems in the United States, the Federal Reserve System
signiﬁcantly expanded and diversiﬁed its facilities for providing liquidity. On the other side of
the Atlantic, the European Central Bank exploited an already existing tool within its operational
framework, its weekly “repo auctions”.4
For many ﬁnancial market participants seeking access to liquidity, repo auctions of the central
bank were an attractive option: the collateral requirements were less strict and (market clearing)
interest rates were signiﬁcantly lower than for unsecured loans in the interbank market. To obtain
1On August 9, 2007 BNP Paribas announced its decision to freeze three investment funds with exposure to high-
grade segments of the U.S. subprime home-loan market. The combined value of the funds was e1.59 billion ($2.19
billion) (Wall Street Journal, August 10-12, 2007).
2EURIBOR, Euro Interbank Oﬀer Rate, is a daily reference rate based on the averaged interest rates at which
banks oﬀer to lend unsecured funds to other banks in the euro interbank market.
3In this paper, we focus mainly on one-week maturity rates as this is the maturity of the regular repo operations
of the ECB. However, even more dramatic jumps in the unsecured-secured spread occurred for longer maturity loans.
We analyze loans with 3-month maturity in section A.4. Not only did the spreads increase, but the set of securities
that were acceptable as collateral in the interbank market also became much smaller, which renders the repo rate
not directly comparable (see e.g., the BearingPoint Report, 2008).
4It is interesting to note that in the U.S. during the early stages of the crisis (2007H2) it was the Federal Home
Loan Bank System, not the Federal Reserve System, which was the main provider of liquidity support to U.S. ﬁnancial
institutions. For example, as documented by Ashcraft, Bech and Frame (2008) Washington Mutual (which failed
on September 25, 2008) received liquidity support in Q4 2007 amounting to about $64 billion representing 20% of
its total assets. Countrywide ($48 billion in Q4 2007) and Wachovia ($42 billion in Q4 2007) also were among the
institutions that received liquidity support from the FHLB System in 2007.7
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Difference between 1−w unsecured rate (EURIBOR) and 1−w repo rate (EUREPO)
August 9, 2007 (week 32)
Figure 1: Spread between the unsecured and secured lending rates
a loan at the EUREPO rate in the post-turmoil period, the collateral had to be virtually risk-free
– basically just high-quality government paper.Therefore, for many potential borrowers the better
option might have been to obtain liquidity by participating in the auctions run by the central bank
where the collateral requirements were not as stringent.5
This paper analyzes unique data on bidding behavior in the repo market to provide a dis-
aggregated snapshot of the funding costs of Euro-system banks during the 2007 subprime crisis.
Our work complements prior analyses providing an aggregate picture of this crisis by Taylor and
Williams (2008, 2009), Michaud and Upper (2008), Wu (2008), and McAndrews, Sarkar and Wang
(2008) among others , who have focused, as above, on the spread between the secured (collateral-
ized) and unsecured lending rates in the interbank money market.6 These papers report a large
jump in these spreads beginning in August 2007, and analyze the impact of various central bank
actions on subsequent yield spreads.
While yield spreads paint a useful picture of the market-level impact of the liquidity crisis,
5Even in the U.S., the Federal Home Loan Bank System accepted mortgage-backed securities as collateral for its
advances to ﬁnancial institutions.
6These studies also look at the spread between the overnight interest swap rates and unsecured lending rates.
The correlation between these spreads and the secured/unsecured spread is very high, as documented by Taylor and
Williams (2008). We ﬁnd this in our data as well: a regression of the overnight swap rate (EONIA swap)/unsecured
(EURIBOR) rate spread and the secured(EUREPO)/unsecured(EURIBOR) spread has coeﬃcient 1.05(t =1 5 .96),
with R
2 =0 .84, which is similar to the results reported by Taylor and Williams (2008) for U.S. equivalents.8
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and could be used as a “temperature gauge” for assessing the health of credit markets, it is not
possible to assess the heterogeneity of the impact of the crisis across the banking system without
access to information on individual banks’ funding costs. The ability to assess the heterogeneity
of the impact of the crisis on individual banks is very important in order for the policy makers to
ﬁnd and implement any cost-minimizing solution. Unfortunately, obtaining high-frequency data on
individual banks’ borrowing costs is diﬃcult, because most interbank transactions take place on an
over-the-counter basis, or through anonymized trading. Bank-level bidding data from ECB’s repo
auctions therefore provide us with a unique opportunity for understanding the distribution of the
severity of the liquidity crisis across the banking sector. We use structural econometric methods
developed in the recent multi-unit auction literature to estimate banks’ willingness-to-pay for ECB
loans from their bids and use these estimates to quantify the impact of the liquidity crisis on
individual banks. In Section 5 below, we provide a simple economic model to link the participating
banks’ willingness-to-pay for ECB loans in the repo auctions to their outside options of procuring
liquidity through the (unsecured and/or secured) interbank markets.
We should emphasize that, unlike the Fed, the ECB does not have supervisory/regulatory
authority over European banks. Such powers are exercised by national central banks and/or regu-
lation agencies. However, the ECB can advise national central banks with regards to the “stresses”
in the ﬁnancial system. Bids at the repo auctions and our analysis thereof in this paper can help
the ECB fulﬁll its advisory duty by providing high frequency country or bank-speciﬁc liquidity cost
measures and analyzing their determinants.
The ﬁrst characteristic of our data that is immediately visible is the sudden change in bidding
behavior that occurred after the turmoil. A quick glance at the aggregate bid7 for auctions before
and after August 9, 2007 reveals a signiﬁcant change. Figure 2 shows the aggregate bids (normalized
by subtracting the EONIA swap rate8). Before August 9, 2007 all aggregate bids (depicted with
solid lines) were highly concentrated around the EONIA swap rate (i.e., around 0 on the vertical
axis in the graph); it is regarded as an indicator of industry expectations of the relevant market
7The aggregate bid in an auction is simply a horizontal sum of individual bids submitted by all participants in
that auction.
8An “EONIA swap” is an interest rate swap transaction, where one party agrees to receive/pay a ﬁxed rate to
another party, against paying/receiving a ﬂoating rate termed EONIA (Euro OverNight Index Average), which is an
average of all actual overnight unsecured transactions.9
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interest rates because it can be used with overnight borrowing as an alternative to bidding in the
repo auctions. After August 9, a signiﬁcant upward shift and increased (both across [and within]
auction) heterogeneity in aggregate bids is quite evident.































       Bidding Behavior in Auctions
 (Each line corresponds to one auction)
Aggregate Bid − EONIA (Before Turmoil)
Aggregate Bid − EONIA (After Turmoil)
Figure 2: Aggregate bids (horizontal sum of individual bids in an auction)
While the dramatic shift in aggregate bids in ECB’s liquidity auctions parallels developments
in interbank markets, our analysis shows that the distinction between “bids” and “willingness-
to-pay” is very important in this market. As we illustrate in Section 4 and Section 6, although
virtually all banks’ bidding behavior changed dramatically after August 9, this does not necessarily
indicate a shift in all banks’ willingness-to-pay for ECB provided liquidity. Even if some bidders
did not experience a change in their costs of short-term funds from alternative sources, presumably
because of their solid balance sheets and lack of exposure to problematic assets, these bidders
rationally would have to adjust their bids as a best-response to their “distressed” competitors’
higher willingness-to-pay for ECB provided liquidity. That is, the shift in bids for ECB liquidity
was both “fundamentals” based, that is based on an increase in the outside funding costs of a subset
of banks, and “strategic”, arising from the best-responses of strategic bidders in a competitive
environment. Indeed, in Section 6 we show that for about one third of the participants, the
observed change in bidding behavior was simply a strategic response: while their costs of obtaining
short-term funds stayed the same (and thus willingness-to-pay also did not change), they increased
their bids in order to best-respond to the higher bids of their rivals.10
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As for the bidders whose willingness-to-pay for ECB-provided liquidity increased signiﬁcantly
after August 2007, it is important to understand the determinants of this shift and quantify it. We
ﬁrst demonstrate that the incidence of the liquidity “squeeze” was much more severe on some banks
than others: for over 1
3 of banks participating in the primary liquidity auctions the borrowing cost
increased by more than 20 basis points. There is also heterogeneity in the incidence of the crisis
with respect to banks’ country-of-origin, and that some of these country-speciﬁc woes may have
been predictable: in Section 6.4, we show that banks from member countries that relied less on
ECB funding before August 2007 appear to have suﬀered less from the crisis.
To further investigate what led to the shifts in demand for liquidity at the bank level, we use in
Section 6.6 an auxiliary dataset on a smaller subset of banks’ credit default swap (CDS) rates and
their reserve requirements with the ECB. We demonstrate that this increase in willingness-to-pay
for ECB liquidity is linked to a deterioration in credit/default ratings (as measured by CDS rates)
and to banks’ worries about satisfying the reserve requirements.
Although “market-based” measures of banks’ ﬁnancial health such as CDS rates and stock
prices are closely monitored by the ECB, the majority of banks in Europe do not have credit-
default swaps traded on their bonds, and/or are not publicly traded themselves. Most of the
information that is available by such non-publicly traded banks is limited to balance sheets that
are disclosed quarterly and sometimes annually. A natural question to ask, therefore, is whether
the individual short-term liquidity demands we estimate using the auction data are at all related to
the performance measures reported in bank balance sheets. Indeed, in Section 6.7, we ﬁnd that the
estimated marginal valuations of banks are predictive of several widely used performance measures
(return-on-equity, return-on-assets, cost-to-income ratio) that are reported at the end of 2007 (i.e.
the end of the auction sample we study). Moreover, we ﬁnd that marginal values are much better
predictors of these performance measures than the bids themselves. This suggests that extracting
away the “strategic” component of bids leads to much improved measures of banks’ liquidity costs,
and eventually proﬁts.11
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stable relationship between the banks’ implied willingness-to-pay and reported interbank rates broke
down. As the starkest demonstration of this point, on several occasions after the turmoil, the market
clearing interest rate for collateralized loans issued through the primary auctions (which constitutes
a lower bound on the willingness-to-pay for the marginal bank under normal circumstances) was
higher than the reported interest rate for the unsecured loans issued in the interbank market. In
section 6.3, we present detailed evidence that the reported unsecured interest rates (EURIBOR in
the EURO context) failed to reﬂect the “actual” unsecured borrowing rates that were faced by a
large number of banks in the EURO area.9
We also use our estimates of banks’ willingness-to-pay to evaluate whether the discriminatory
auction mechanism employed by the ECB succeeded in implementing an eﬃcient allocation. In
section 6.5 we show that while in the pre-crisis period the auction played little role in improving
upon any random allocation of liquidity, after the crisis it clearly helped matching of liquidity
supply with the banks with higher willingness-to-pay.
From a broader perspective, our results suggest that the evolution of banks’ willingness-to-pay
for liquidity may be useful for policymakers. While many questions may be answered with balance
sheet data, its questionable reliability and low frequency make the readily available data from
bidding in weekly liquidity auctions more attractive. Moreover, we show that even the relatively
high-frequency CDS or stock price data do not seem to explain much of the contemporaneous
variation in the willingness-to-pay for liquidity. Recent advances in multi-unit auction theory and
in empirical methods for modelling auction markets allow us to recover the willingness-to-pay
directly from the bids very quickly.10
We now move on in Section 2 to describing the growing literature on the ﬁnancial turmoil,
providing context for the rest of our paper. We describe the primary repo auctions of the ECB in
Section 3; in Section 4 we describe our dataset taken from these auctions and summarize several
interesting facts that these data reveal. In Section 5 we sketch a simple model, and we use our data
in conjunction with our model to recover bidders’ willingness-to-pay for ECB loans. For interested
9This criticism of LIBOR (London Interbank Oﬀer Rate which, like EURIBOR, is a rate for unsecured inter-
bank loans) rates induced the British Bankers’ Association to publish the consultative paper “Understanding the
construction and operation of LIBOR – strengthening for the future” on June 10, 2008.
10See Athey and Haile (2005) or Hendricks and Porter (2007) for surveys of recent advances in empirical methods
and Milgrom (2004) for an excellent auction theory overview.
Another result of our analysis is that in the period beginning in August 2007, the previously12
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readers, in Appendix A.2 we review a more detailed model of a discriminatory auction of a perfectly
divisible unit good, its equilibrium characterization, and the estimation method that we proposed
in our previous work. Section 6 contains the main messages of this paper. In there, we present our
main results in a sequence of subsections and discuss implications of our ﬁndings. We argue that
(i) accounting for the strategic component when analyzing bids is very important for identifying
distressed banks (Section 6.2), (ii) using the publicly posted rates for secured and unsecured loans
we demonstrate that the bids are informative about the collateral structure of the participating
banks (Section 6.3), (iii) there are substantial cross-country diﬀerences in the extent of the impact
of the crisis on the banking sector related to the quality of collateral available in banks’ portfolios
(which is consistent, for example, the eﬀect of Iceland’s bakruptcy being concentrated in only
few countries of the EURO zone) (Section 6.4), and (iv) CDS prices and reserve requirements are
indeed drivers of banks’ marginal values (Section 6.6). Section 6.7 investigates the relationship
between our marginal value estimates, and banks’ 2007 year-end balance sheet-based performance
measures. Section 6.5 discusses the eﬃciency properties of the allocation mechanism used by the
ECB. Section 7 concludes. (Appendix A.1 is devoted to more details about the way the ECB
conducts its monetary policy and its operations.)
2 Turmoil in the Literature
By now, the signiﬁcance of the 2007 ﬁnancial crisis for the evolution of the world economy is widely
recognized. Numerous leading economists provided their thoughts on the crisis in the winter 2009
issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives.11 Painting an aggregate picture of the crisis in
an inﬂuential series of papers, Taylor and Williams (2008, 2009) have argued that the increase in
the spread between the term swap rates used to proxy the expectations of overnight lending rates
of ﬁnancial market participants and the rates for unsecured term loans is probably caused by an
increase in the counter-party risk.12 In particular, after the news about the extent of highly risky
subprime loans among securities with highest ratings held by many banks in their portfolios, there
11See e.g., Brunnermeier (2009) and Cecchetti (2009).
12In contrast, some papers (e.g., Wu 2008) argue that the increased spread is due to “liquidity risk” stemming
from increased uncertainty about future liquidity needs of each bank, which in turn increases banks’ reluctance to
lend long term.13
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was a sudden shift in the probability of default. Looking at the diﬀerence between the secured and
unsecured loan rates, Taylor and Williams argue that the increase in spread indeed seems to be
due to this eﬀect.13 Afonso et al. (forth.) use data from the overnight interbank market to argue
that counterparty risk seemed to play a much larger role than liquidity hoarding in the time period
following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy.
In a short article, Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (2008) argue that, while there is clear evidence
of a ﬁnancial crisis, some of the often cited sources of this crisis, including the tougher access
to liquidity in the interbank market, are not consistent with publicly available aggregate data.
Cohen-Cole et al. (2008) point out that the aggregate ﬁgures may be missing a lot of details, but
Christiano (2008) disagrees on the whole with their arguments. In this paper we show that by
looking at aggregate data a researcher indeed might miss the relevant changes in the structure of
liquidity demands: while the aggregate demand may have stayed the same, many banks substituted
from the secondary (interbank) market to the primary one, and the collapse of the secondary market
may have important implications for allocative eﬃciency and credit availability. The increased
heterogeneity of willingness-to-pay for liquidity in the post-turmoil period, and the failure of the
interbank market to lead to an eﬃcient allocation of liquidity among banks render the primary
auctions (or open market operations) of the central banks crucial in improving the performance of
the liquidity markets by correcting the misallocation.
Bidding data from repo auctions of the ECB have been studied previously in Bindseil, Nyborg
and Strebulaev (2005). They describe many interesting details of this market and compare these
auctions to those of Treasury bills by studying auctions between June 2000 and June 2001. Among
other things, they argue that the common value component seems much less important in the
central bank repo auction than in T-bill auctions, which substantiates our using the private-values
framework. A similar approach was used in Horta¸ csu and Kastl (2008) to analyze Canadian T-bill
auctions or in Chapman, McAdams and Paarsch’s (2006) analysis of Canadian Receiver General
13As is the case of the U.S., the secured (EUREPO) and overnight swap rates (EONIA swap) are highly correlated in
the Euro area. Taylor and Williams (2009) argue that both rates are close to being riskless, and could be considered
close to perfect substitutes. Although it is a collateralized rate, there is some risk in EUREPO due to potential
problems in the delivery or return of collateral. EONIA swaps are subject to some risk, in that one of the parties
may default and the remaining party is subject to the diﬀerential in the ﬁxed and overnight components of swap. In
our data, EURIBOR-EUREPO spreads and the EURIBOR-EONIA spread are almost perfectly correlated.14
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auctions of cash. While the setting Chapman et al. analyzes is the closest to ours, the objective of
their analysis is quite diﬀerent. Their main interest lies in investigating whether bidders’ behavior
in these auctions is consistent with best-response assumptions. They ﬁnd that violations of best-
responses are frequent, but the extent of these violations is so minimal (in terms of the expected
payoﬀ lost) that assuming that bidders indeed play best-responses may not be a bad idea. Our
approach is to assume that bidders play best-responses. Our goal is to use the estimated model
to analyze the forces behind bidders’ choices and to analyze the impact of the ﬁnancial turmoil
by studying the link between the willingness-to-pay in the repo auctions and alternative sources of
funding.
3 Primary Auctions of Liquidity in the EURO Area
In this paper we focus on the auctions of liquidity, which are part of the Main Reﬁnancing Op-
erations (MROs)14 of the ECB. They are auctions of collateralized loans with one-week maturity,
conducted every week. The main function of the MROs (at least before the turmoil period) is to
provide liquidity to the market. They are pivotal in steering interest rates (through the minimum
bid rate), to manage liquidity in markets, and to signal the stance of monetary policy.
Before each auction, a bank that wants to participate will submit bids specifying the rate and
the quantity it is willing to transact with the ECB to the national central bank of the member
state where the institution is located (has a head oﬃce or branch). The bids of an institution may
be submitted by only one establishment in each member state. Banks may submit bids for up
to ten diﬀerent interest rate levels; hence, a bid in these auctions can be thought of as a demand
function. The ECB then collects the bids and determines the maximum rate at which the demand
weakly exceeds the supply. All bids for higher rates are satisﬁed and demands at the marginal
rate are rationed proportionally. During the time span of our dataset the ECB has used only the
discriminatory auction format, but it has the right to change the mechanism at any time. All
winning bidders thus had to pay their full bids (i.e., rates) for the allocated liquidity.
After each auction, the ECB publicly reveals the following about the outcome: % marginal
14See Section A.1.2 in the appendix for more details.15
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(market clearing) bid rate, allotment at marginal rate, total amount allotted, weighted average
allotment rate, total number of participating bidders, minimum rate of all bids, and maximum rate
of all bids. No additional data that would provide information on demands by individual banks
are revealed.
The loans obtained in these auctions have to be collateralized. In particular, banks are expected
to cover the amounts allotted to them with a suﬃcient level of eligible assets (collateral) discussed
in more detail in section A.1.3. Penalties can be applied by the national central banks in case of a
failure to deliver the collateral. The eligible collateral is broader than collateral generally accepted
for loans at the EUREPO rate on the interbank (secondary) market, even more so after the turmoil.
Nevertheless, the ECB applies valuation haircuts as risk control measures.
Table 1 shows the relative weight for the categories of eligible assets used by Eurosystem counter-
parties. It illustrates that banks substitute illiquid collateral (uncovered bank bonds, asset-backed
securities) for highly liquid collateral (central government securities).15 This trend accelerated af-
ter the turmoil with a sharp increase in asset-backed securities; however, it reﬂects a medium-term
development that has been ongoing for a while and is not strictly related to the turmoil.
Table 1: Structure of Collateral Pledged Against the MROs
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Central government securities 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.42
Regional government securities 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Uncovered bank bonds 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.20
Covered bank bonds 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11
Corporate bonds 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
Asset-backed securities 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09
Other marketable assets 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
Non-marketable assets 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
With this relevant background, we are ready to describe our dataset in detail and go on to
estimate a model of bidding in the repo auctions.
15See also Ewerhart and Tapking (2008)16
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4D a t a
Our unique dataset consists of all submitted bids in 50 regular discriminatory (pay-your-bid) repo
auctions of liquidity provided via collateralized loans with 1-week maturity conducted as part of
the regular MROs of the ECB between January 4, 2007 and December 11, 2007.
Table 2 oﬀers some summary statistics of the full sample. On average, there are 341 participating
bidders (banks) in an auction. There are 733 unique bidder-identities, which suggests that only
about one half of potential bidders participate in any given auction. Participants submit bids with
very few steps (price-quantity pairs): only 1.66 on average. The banks on average demand about
1 billion EUR at 3.94%, which is about 4 basis points higher on average than the EONIA rate.
Table 2: Data Summary
Summary Statistics
Auctions 50
Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Bidders 341 28 273 395
Submitted steps 1.66 1.02 1 10
Price bid 3.94 0.22 3.50 4.36
Price bid spreada 0.04 0.07 -0.17 0.41
Quantity bid 0.004 0.012 3 ∗ 10
−6 0.18
Issued Amount (billions e) 259.89 52.77 155 330.5
a Spread against EONIA rate.
Table 3 illustrates the change in means and standard deviations following the turmoil of August
2007. There are several interesting diﬀerences: the increase in the number of steps in each bid (from
1.47 to 2.02), the decrease in the amount of liquidity oﬀered for sale (from 292.34 to 202.19 billions
EUR) and, perhaps most importantly, the increase in the spread between the bids and the EONIA
rate (from 0 to 10 basis points). Recall that in a discriminatory auction, a bidder would do best
if she knew the market clearing rate beforehand and thus was able to submit a single bid equal to
that rate for an amount at which her marginal value equaled the rate. Therefore, the ﬁrst diﬀerence
likely reﬂects the fact that the bidders were much less certain where the market would clear and
so submitted ﬁner bids.16 An alternative potential explanation for this phenomenon might be that
16Figure 17 (appendix) shows that there is a clear ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance relationship between the em-
pirical cumulative distribution functions before and after the turmoil.17
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Table 3: Data Summary: Before and After August 2007
Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev
Before After Before After
Bidders 348.6 328.1 20.88 34.37
Submitted steps 1.47 2.02 0.73 1.34
Price bid 3.80 4.13 0.20 0.06
Price bid spreada 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.08
Quantity bid 0.004 0.005 0.009 0.014
Issued Amount (billion e) 292.34 202.19 1.42 4.51
a Spread against EONIA rate.
some bidders simply needed to make sure that they received at least some minimal level of liquidity
in the primary market; therefore, they submitted inframarginal bids for which they were willing to
pay a premium over the market clearing rate. Both of these explanations also may be consistent
with the observed increase in the spread between the bids and EONIA. To distinguish between
these two potential explanations, we would need to know the marginal value of that bidder at the
time of placing the bids. Obtaining estimates of these marginal values thus is one of the main goals
of this article.
After August 2007 the bids become much more dispersed, as shown by the aggregate bids
depicted with dashed-dot lines (-.) in Figure 2. In each auction the aggregate bid also becomes
much steeper relative to the aggregate bids before the turmoil, which are depicted as solid lines.
5 Model and Estimation Framework
In order to obtain estimates of the marginal values that would rationalize the observed bids, we
turn to a model of bidding in these discriminatory auctions. Consider ﬁrst the following simple
model of bidding in the primary auction, which links the estimated marginal values to the secondary
market secured and unsecured interest rates. Suppose bank i has a liquidity need (possibly due to
a reserve requirement, to improve its balance sheet, or to close a funding gap) of Ri. This must
be fulﬁlled through three alternative channels: 1) ECB primary auctions, 2) unsecured interbank
lending, which is done through over-the-counter deals, or 3) secured interbank lending, which is18
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also done over-the-counter.17,18
We assume that these methods are substitutes, but access to them is limited based on collateral
availability. In particular, bank i has Li units of “liquid”, high-quality collateral acceptable by
secured interbank lending counterparties at a zero “haircut” rate. The bank also has Ki −Li units
of securities that are acceptable by the ECB and perhaps by other counterparties as collateral, but
are subject to haircuts. The haircuts applied to this set of securities eﬀectively increase the interest
rate at which the bank can borrow against these securities; these rates are bounded below by the
“secured” interbank lending rate, si, that the bank faces (which assumes the use of highest quality,
i.e. zero haircut collateral), and bounded above by the “unsecured” interbank lending rate, ui,
which requires no collateral. The marginal value for obtaining liquidity in the auctions run by the
ECB can therefore be represented as in Figure 3, where we assume the bank’s total collateralized
borrowing capacity, Ki, to be less than its liquidity need Ri. The bank’s willingness-to-pay for
the ﬁrst Ri − Ki euros of funding, thus, is equal to its unsecured funding rate, ui. Between the
Ri−Ki and Ri−Li, the bank faces diﬀerent haircut rates depending on its portfolio of securities it
can post as collateral. The last Li euros of funding can be obtained from the “secured” interbank
market, thus the bank’s willingness-to-pay for these units is si.
5.1 Model of Bidding and Econometric Framework
In the previous section we discussed the origin of banks’ marginal valuations for ECB loans in
terms of the “outside” sources of funding the bank can access through the use of its collateralizable
securities.19 We now have to impose assumptions regarding the information structure of the auction,
17Managing the maturity mismatch between assets (long-term) and liabilities (short-term) is the essence of banking.
Before the crisis, a variety of instruments allowed banks to fund their assets without major constraints. Short-term
funding was available in the form of interbank loans, issuance of Certiﬁcate of Deposits (CDs), and central bank
reﬁnancing; longer-term funding was available from bond issuance (covered or uncovered) and through securitization.
The securitization and the interbank funding channels were among the most severely disrupted sources of liquidity
immediately after August 2007. Bond issuance without government guarantees also was impaired. Any such alter-
native ways of obtaining liquidity get lumped into the “outside option” that generates the willingness to pay at the
repo auction.
18 The interbank market operates to a large degree as an over-the-counter (OTC) market, for which (to the best of
our knowledge) there is hardly any transaction-level data that could be used for our purposes. The impact of liquidity
shocks and other frictions on prices in OTC markets has been studied in Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu and Pedersen (2007).
Their model of the OTC market is based on the search and bargaining model proposed in Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu and
Pedersen (2005), which provides conditions under which asset prices are adversely aﬀected by frictions in the OTC
market, such as increased diﬃculty to ﬁnd a counterparty.
19See Ewerhart, Cassola and Valla (2009) for a similar model with more detailed discussion.19
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Figure 3: Marginal Value for Liquidity in ECB Auctions
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i.e. what is the nature of private information, if any, possessed by bidders who participate in the
ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations.
Given the opaque, over-the-counter nature of interbank-lending markets, we will assume that
the interest rates at which a bank can secure liquidity in the market (si,u i) are private information
for bank i. Similarly, we will assume that the liquidity requirement, Ri and the bank’s collateral
structure, Li, Ki, and the haircut rates applicable to the bank’s collateralizable securities, are also
private information. Although some proxies for these variables are disclosed in quarterly balance
sheets, certain securitization practices, such as the use of structured investment vehicles, could
easily mask a bank’s underlying asset-liability structure (Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2009)).
Moreover, the weekly frequency of the auctions can presumably allow bidders to keep information
about short-term changes in their portfolios and funding requirements conﬁdential.
The main informational assumption we will impose in the rest of the paper is that the en-
vironment is one of conditionally independent private values. That is, conditional on variables
commonly observed by bidders, bidders’ marginal willingness-to-pay depends on their own private
information, which is distributed independently across bidders, and, importantly, does not depend
on other bidders’ information. The private values assumption was implicit in our discussion in the20
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previous subsection, where we argued that a bidder’s marginal willingness-to-pay will depend on
{Ri,K i,L i,u i,s i} and haircut rates on its asset portfolio. This assumption is partially motivated
by earlier work by Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2005) who ﬁnd that bidders’ reserve balances
are an important factor in how they bid. Yet another piece of evidence for private values is the
observation that since after the crisis the interbank markets dried out, the speculative reasons
for obtaining liquidity in the ECB’s auctions motivated by potential resale opportunities were not
likely present.
An interdependent values speciﬁcation would be more appropriate if other bidders’ funding
requirements and opportunities are also relevant for bidder i’s willingness-to-pay. Although banks’
exposure to each other through interbank lending may lead to such interdependencies, we will
assume that these interdependencies enter into the bidder’s willingness-to-pay through variables
commonly observed by all bidders, such as publicly available (to the bidders) interbank rate and
liquidity information, and other ﬁnancial news and data. Our econometric approach will allow
bidders to condition their bids on publicly observable common valuation components, some of
which may be unobservable to the econometrician.20
We now move on to describing how banks will bid in the auctions. The ECB allows bidders to
place multiple price/quantity bids: in eﬀect, bidding demand schedules. Therefore, our model is
based on Wilson’s (1979) share auction model, in which bidders compete for one unit of a perfectly
divisible good, submit demand curves and their choice of quantity is continuous. We view this
model as appropriate for our setting because the amount of credit to be sold in each auction is over
e2 billion and the minimum bid increment is only e100,000.
Kastl (2008) analyzes a variant of Wilson’s model with bidding in step functions, which is
also the appropriate modiﬁcation for our application. He proves that there exists an equilibrium
of a discriminatory auction in distributional strategies in this constrained game when signals are
independent and price is assumed to be continuous. The model and its assumptions are formally
20Our econometric analysis is applicable even if there is an interdependent value component beyond what can be
conditioned on commonly observed (by bidders) variables, but using the equilibrium conditions given by (1) below
we estimate roughly the expected marginal value for liquidity conditional on k
th step being marginal and thus qk
allocated to type θi, Eθ−i|θi,Pc∈[bk+1,bk],qk [v (qk,θ i,θ −i)], rather than the (realized) private value v (qk,θ i). While
the estimation method is not aﬀected, we would have to work with thinner data, since we can only use estimates at
which the conditioning event P
c ∈ [bk+1,b k] is actually satisﬁed. See Horta¸ csu and Kastl (2008) for more details.21
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spelled out in the appendix section A.2. The necessary conditions for equilibrium bidding by bank
with private information θi are (for demand qk at every step k at which the marginal valuation
function is continuous in q):
v (qk,θ i)=bk +
Pr(bk+1 ≥ Pc)
Pr(bk >Pc >b k+1)
(bk − bk+1)( 1 )
where Pc is the market clearing price, which is random from the perspective of each bidder, qk is
the quantity demanded at step k and bk is the associated bid.
Equation (1) is the main identiﬁcation equation in our analysis; it simply describes the equi-
librium relationship between bids and values. In our earlier discussion, we tied these values to the
bank’s “outside options” of procuring liquidity through secured and unsecured interbank markets.
The intuition for the underlying trade-oﬀ is quite similar to that of the single-unit ﬁrst-
price auction. The intuition can also be seen when we rewrite the optimality conditions as
Pr(bk >Pc >b k+1)(v (qk,θ i) − bk)=P r ( bk+1 ≥ Pc)(bk − bk+1). This equation states that the
marginal loss of surplus due to decreasing the demand at price bk whenever the kth step is the
marginal step in i’s demand (and thus the market clearing price must be between bk and bk+1)
should be traded-oﬀ against the possible gains when the kth step is inframarginal (and thus the
market clearing price must be weakly lower than bk+1). Thus, by shifting some demand to the
subsequent (k+1)st step, we would decrease the payment by the diﬀerence between the bids (times
the quantity shifted). It is important to emphasize that the necessary conditions given by (1) have
to hold at each step k. Therefore, we do not need to directly model the choice of the number of
steps, Ki (θi), that bidder i submits.
Since, in practice, the continuity in q of the marginal valuation function might be questionable
at the last step, we use the optimality equation with respect to bid given by equation (A-3) in the
appendix to identify the marginal value corresponding to the last step in a bid function.
Using these necessary conditions, we obtain point estimates of the marginal values at submitted
quantity-steps nonparametrically using a resampling method proposed and analyzed in our earlier
work.21. We extend this method in this paper to allow for latent types. The basic resampling
21See Horta¸ csu and Kastl (2008) for formal treatment of the estimation and Athey and Haile (2005) for a recent22
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method is based on simulating diﬀerent possible states of the world (realizations of the vector of
private information) using the data available to the econometrician and leveraging the assumption
of conditional independence of private information, thus obtaining an estimator of the distribution
of the market clearing prices. It works as follows:
Suppose there are two groups with Nh,N b potential bidders that are (ex ante) symmetric within
groups.22 Fix a bidder’s bid from group h (the argument for a bidder from group b is analogous).
From the observed data, draw (with replacement) Nh−1a n dNb actual bid functions. This simulates
one possible state of the world from the perspective of the ﬁxed bidder from group h – a possible
vector of private information – and thus results in one potential realization of the residual supply.
Intersecting this residual supply with the ﬁxed bid, we obtain a market clearing price. Repeating
this procedure many times, we obtain an estimate of the full distribution of the market clearing
price conditional on the ﬁxed bid. Using this estimated distribution of market clearing price, we
can obtain our estimates of marginal values at each submitted step using (1). It is important to
point out that since we have over 300 participants in every auction, we conduct our estimation
auction-by-auction and hence our estimates are less susceptible to unobserved heterogeneity across
auctions.23 Also, by estimating auction-by-auction, for the resampling method we only need to
require that bidders’ private signals are conditionally independent where the conditioning is on all
public information available at the time of the auction.
Horta¸ csu and Kastl (2008) show that this estimator is asymptotically normally distributed and
well-behaved, in the sense that its asymptotic distribution can be approximated by bootstrap,
which is also how we obtain standard errors in this application.
Since we do not observe ex-ante which group a bidder belongs to, in the following subsection
we extend this method to allow for latent types which are also estimated.
survey of nonparametric estimation techniques for auction data.
22Additional observed ex-ante heterogeneity among bidders (such as size) is easily incorporated by introducing
additional groups. The cost of adding more dimensions is the lower number of observations used for resampling.
23For readers unfamiliar with this terminology, we might be worried that there are factors observed by the bidders
before each auction, which are not observed by the econometrician. This would of course undermine the ex-ante
symmetry across auctions and hence focusing on bids within an auction eliminates this particular problem.23
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5.1.1 Asymmetric bidders
Because one of the goals of this paper is to identify bidders (banks) that likely have been hit harder
by the ﬁnancial turmoil than their rivals, in the sense that their value for liquidity obtained in the
primary market (stochastically) increased, the assumption that all banks are ex-ante symmetric
might of course not be appropriate. In particular, the distributions from which the private in-
formation is drawn would very likely diﬀer between the banks that suﬀered from the crisis (group
indexed with b for “bad” banks) and those that did not (group indexed with h for “healthy” banks).
We adopt an iterative procedure and estimate an asymmetric model with two groups of banks as
follows: in the ﬁrst step, we start the algorithm by arbitrarily allocating bank identities across
the two groups24. The resampling method is modiﬁed to allow for two groups of bidders that are
symmetric within a group, but not necessarily across the groups. This is achieved by drawing
with replacement from observed bids from each group separately. We thus obtain estimates of the
marginal values of each bidder in every auction. In the second step, we use these estimated values to
ﬁnd a subset of bidders who experienced a stochastic increase in their estimated values for liquidity
in the post-turmoil period. We assume that experiencing ﬁnancial distress in our model translates
into a shift in the distribution of marginal values in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance.
There are many alternatives to check for this shift, and the test we use is based on comparing
means of the distributions before and after turmoil for each bidder. This test is operationalized by
regressing the quantity-weighted average of the marginal value estimates (normalized by EONIA
to take out the level eﬀect of interest rates25) on the turmoil dummy for each bidder separately.
If the estimated coeﬃcient on the turmoil dummy is signiﬁcant at 5% level – i.e., if the mean
marginal value increased – we classify this bidder as one who experienced ﬁnancial distress in the
post-turmoil period. In the third step of our algorithm, we re-estimate the model using the newly
obtained two groups of bidders.26 In the fourth step, we again estimate the subset of bidders that
experienced an increase in their values by using the estimates from the asymmetric model. If this
24In practice, we started both with allocating all banks into the Healthy Group and with a random allocation, both
of which led to statistically indistinguishable estimates.
25See Piazzesi (2003) for a thorough discussion of the recent literature on the structure of interest rates.
26Bidders are treated asymmetrically in all auctions. That is, we ﬁx the two groups even before turmoil. Had the
bidders been actually symmetric before turmoil, our approach would result only in loss of eﬃciency, but the estimates
of the distribution of the market clearing price would still be consistent.24
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subset coincides with the two groups used in step 3, then we stop; otherwise, we repeat step 3.27
In practice, we stop the algorithm when weakly less than 5 bidder identities switch groups. We are
able to classify 482 bidder identities out of the 733 in our data. The remaining bidder identities do
not submit bids both before and after the turmoil.
That the initial assignment of banks into groups does not seem to matter in our application is
due to the fact that we have a large number of banks in each group. Therefore the distributions
of market clearing price from perspective of a bidder from group b or h submitting the same bid
are virtually indistinguishable since with large Nb and Nh, whether we are drawing Nb,N h − 1o r
Nb − 1,N h does not make much diﬀerence. This in turn results in virtually the same estimates of
marginal values (whether a bidder was assigned to b or h) and hence essentially unique allocation
of bidders into the two groups. We conjecture that the impact of the asymmetry on the estimates
of marginal values and thus on the identiﬁcation of the latent types would likely be much more
profound with small number of bidders in each group.
5.1.2 Supply Uncertainty
In the pre-turmoil period the actual amount of liquidity allocated in the auction by the ECB diﬀered
only slightly from the pre-announced supply, but as Figure 22 illustrates the deviations became quite
substantial in the post-turmoil period. We assume that bidders rationally expected the ECB to
deviate from the announced benchmark. To incorporate this feature into our estimation framework,
we use the empirical distributions of deviations from the pre-announced supply in the pre- and post-
turmoil period. At each iteration of our resampling algorithm, we resample independently from
the corresponding empirical distribution of supply deviations. Appendix A.3 provides more details
about the way supply is determined in the weekly repo auctions.
27While we do not have a formal proof of whether this method converges, if it does, it is easy to see that the
resulting estimates are consistent estimates of the primitives of the asymmetric model. In the actual application, it
turns out that after very few iterations, the two groups of bidders are very stable – both in terms of size and in terms
of identities of bidders contained in each. The asymmetry therefore seems not to play as important a role in the
estimation stage, which is probably due to the large number of participants. We experimented with a random initial
assignement of bidders into the two groups; after very few iterations, we obtained virtually the same bidder groups
as those arrived at when starting with the symmetric model.25
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6R e s u l t s
Having laid out the model and the estimation method in the previous sections, we now move on
to discuss the results. Using the estimated willingness-to-pay for each bank in each auction we
analyze the impact of the crisis on the individual banks and on the whole banking sector of the
EURO area. We show that more than 50% of banks cannot borrow at the published unsecured
rates. We also document that the impact of the crisis was quite heterogeneous across countries
and could to a certain extent be predicted on a country-level based on the banks’ bidding behavior
before the turmoil. On a subsample of 19 banks for which we obtained additional data, we analyze
the determinants of the willingness-to-pay and show that our estimates covary in an expected way
with reserve requirements and prices of credit default swap contracts. Lastly, merging our estimates
with Bankscope data, we show that our estimates of marginal values are (unlike the bids) predictive
of various accounting measures of bank performance.
6.1 Estimated willingness-to-pay
Figures 4 and 5 depict the estimated marginal values for the same bidder in two auctions, one before
and one after the turmoil. We can make two observations: 1) This bidder’s demand increased
substantially, from about 8% of the supply before the turmoil to 14% of the supply after the
turmoil;28 and 2) Uncertainty about where the market would clear substantially increased and
therefore this bidder submitted a more detailed demand curve. (Recall that if a bidder knew with
certainty that the market would clear at a price p∗ in a discriminatory auction, then the optimal
bidding strategy would be to submit only one bid at this price, and for a quantity such that the
marginal value of the expected allocation after rationing would be equal to p∗.) Finally, notice that
the estimated (quantity-weighted) marginal value before the turmoil is just slightly higher than
the EONIA swap rate (which corresponds to 0 on the vertical axis). This suggests that buying
the ﬁxed leg of the swap and borrowing overnight was indeed an option for many banks. After
the turmoil, though, the estimated marginal values were signiﬁcantly above the EONIA swap rate,
suggesting that this particular bank valued the liquidity obtained in the repo auctions of the ECB
28Recall that the supply declined by about one third after the turmoil, which makes the demand increase perhaps
not as large, but still this increase amounts to about e5 billion.26
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Figure 4: Bid and Estimated Marginal Value
(Before Turmoil)
















































Bids and estimated marginal values after turmoil (bider 706)








Figure 5: Bid and Estimated Marginal Value
(After Turmoil)
more, perhaps because its access to the EONIA rate may have been limited, and/or it did not
have enough high-quality collateral to participate in the collateralized interbank market to obtain
loans at the EUREPO rate. This change in values, and thus indirectly the implied ability of an
individual bank to access liquidity in the interbank market, would be missing if we were to analyze
aggregate data, such as in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (2008).
Overall, we ﬁnd a profound eﬀect of the August 2007 turmoil on marginal valuations that
bidders attach to liquidity oﬀered for sale in the primary markets. Figure 6 illustrates this eﬀect in
more detail. The solid lines depict estimated aggregate (i.e., horizontal sum of) marginal valuation
curves before the turmoil (normalized by subtracting the EONIA swap rate), and the dash-dotted
lines (-.) depict the estimated aggregate marginal valuation curves after the turmoil of August
2007.29 It is apparent that an outward shift in marginal values (towards north-east) has taken
place, suggesting that, at least for some bidders, the liquidity provided in the primary market
became very valuable relative to the period before August 2007.
To further illustrate this eﬀect, consider Figures 7 and 8 which depict the aggregate bids and
aggregate marginal valuation curves for two auctions, one before and one after the turmoil. Again,
it clearly illustrates that the EONIA swap rate which played a role of a reference point for bidding in
29The high marginal values on the left portion of the aggregate marginal valuation curves are usually imprecisely
estimated and hence we chose to trim the ﬁgure at a mark-up of 50 basis points. These are values corresponding to
so high bids that are almost certainly going to be accepted and hence the term Pr(bk >P
c >b k+1)i n( 1 )i sv e r y
small and imprecisely estimated.27
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Figure 6: Estimated Aggregate Marginal Valuation Curves
the pre-turmoil period, most likely no longer served this role after the turmoil. More importantly,
the amount of shading (the area between the aggregate marginal value and the aggregate bids)
increased substantially in most auctions. For example, at the market clearing price (i.e., where
the vertical line at Q = 1 intersects the marginal value and the bid), the amount of shading in
Figure 7 is about 1.5 basis points, whereas it increases to over 3 basis points in Figure 8. This
is a consequence of the change in the slope of the aggregate bids and hence of increased market
power of marginal bidders and/or uncertainty about the market clearing price. More importantly,
in auction 32 before turmoil, the bidding is concentrated on the EONIA and repo rates and the
market clears at exactly the repo rate. After turmoil (in auction 45), neither EUREPO, EONIA,
or EURIBOR seem to be a focal point of bids. Moreover, the market clears at signiﬁcantly above
all three rates.30
Figure 9 depicts the estimated quantity-weighted average marginal values in each auction nor-
malized by subtracting the corresponding EONIA swap rate (a very similar pattern obtains if we
normalized by the EUREPO rate). The emerging pattern again suggests that the (normalized)
marginal values for liquidity provided in the primary market increased substantially following the
30Since the goal of the ECB is to target the overnight interest rate, of which the 1-w EONIA swap rate is an
expectation, this suggests that the ECB might have faced some problems with achieving its objectives in the post-
turmoil period.28
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Figure 7: Aggregate Bids and Estimated Aggre-
gate Marginal Values (Before Turmoil)









































Figure 8: Aggregate Bid and Estimated Aggre-
gate Marginal Values Curve (After Turmoil)
turmoil in August 2007. In fact, it still seems to be increasing, in the most recent auctions in our
data reaching over 20 basis points premium over the EONIA swap rate. Even more importantly,
the marginal values have become quite heterogeneous, which is evidenced by the increased slope of
aggregate marginal valuation curves in Figure 6.
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Figure 9: Quantity-weighted average marginal values (across all bidders)29
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6.2 Identiﬁcation of “Distressed” Bidders
The model helps us identify the shift in the distribution of marginal values, since the shading factor
Pr(bk+1≥P c)
Pr(bk>P c>bk+1) (bk − bk+1) can be estimated for every bidder in every auction. For some bidders,
the bids change only enough to compensate for the increased aggressivness of their rivals (which in
turn aﬀects the distribution of the market clearing price), while maintaining the trade-oﬀ between
the surplus on the last Euro won and the probability of winning it given by (1). For such bidders,
we therefore obtain the same estimates of marginal values. For other bidders, the bids change in
a way that is inconsistent with maintaining that trade-oﬀ for a given marginal value and hence
for such bidders, marginal values had to change as well. Having estimated the marginal values
for each bidder before and after the turmoil, we now can look for the eﬀect of the turmoil on
these values. In particular, for 482 bidders who participate at least once before and after the
turmoil, we regress the quantity-weighted estimates of marginal values for each bidder on a turmoil
dummy. Figure 10 plots the histogram of the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients from these regressions. For
almost 100 bidders, the (normalized) marginal values have risen by more than 20 basis points in
the post-turmoil period. This exercise reveals another interesting point: the turmoil seemed to be
accompanied by an increase in marginal value for liquidity in the primary market for about two
thirds of the participants, whereas the remaining one third experienced no signiﬁcant increase.
Our conclusions might be quite diﬀerent if we based the analysis solely on bids and hence we
believe that using a model to separate out the strategic eﬀect is quite important. Running the
same type of regressions, but using quantity-weighted bids (again normalized by EONIA) rather
than marginal values would result in a signiﬁcantly positive relationship for virtually all bidders.
Table 4 shows that the predictions diﬀer for over 20% of the banks. Given the amounts of money
that often are mentioned in connection with helping the struggling banking sector, whether 20% of
banks seem to be healthy or not might potentially be quite important.
As a placebo test of the last exercise, we also tried focusing exclusively on the time period
before the turmoil (we observe 32 auctions before the turmoil in our data) and splitting this subset
of data into two halves, before and after auction 16.31 Regressing bids and values, respectively, on
31Once again we obtained virtually the same results initializing our algorithm with symmetric bidders or with
random assignment of bidders into two groups.30
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Figure 10: Histogram of Signiﬁcant Turmoil Eﬀects




Values Yes 326 5
No 96 55
a dummy for auctions 16 − 32 results in data on both bids and values showing no eﬀect for 398
banks; exhibiting a signiﬁcant eﬀect for 6 banks; and for 19 and 20 banks, respectively, they seem to
have been signiﬁcantly aﬀected based either on bids or on values data, but not both. This exercise
suggests that the diﬀerence in predictions based on values and bids reported in Table 4 appears
likely not to be by chance. In fact, it suggests that the turmoil had an important eﬀect, causing
signiﬁcant changes in bids for most banks, but with the underlying values actually changing only
for a smaller subset of banks.
Figures 11 and 12 provide another illustration of why accounting for the strategic eﬀect maybe
very important in identifying banks whose demand for liquidity was aﬀected by the crisis. In
Figure 11, we plot the density of the average diﬀerence in quantity-weighted price bids in the post
vs. pre-crisis period auctions. We plot the densities separately for the banks that we identiﬁed as
being “hard-hit” vs. “not hard-hit.” As can be seen, although there are some visible diﬀerences31
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across the two densities, the means are very similar, and the supports of the two densities largely
overlap. In contrast, when we plot the densities of the diﬀerence in estimated marginal values
across the post vs. pre-crisis auctions, we see a much more visible diﬀerence across the “hard-hit”
vs. “not hard-hit” groups; while the mean marginal value change for the not hard-hit group is at
zero, the mean of the “hard-hit” group, indeed the entire density, has shifted to the right.
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Figure 13: EUREPO, EURIBOR and primary auction clearing rates32
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6.3 Bidders’ Marginal Valuations and Secondary Market Rates
Our application also is naturally suited to subjecting the estimates from the structural model to a
quick reality check. In particular, as Section 5 suggested, the values (bid plus markup) of each bank
should lie between the fully unsecured lending rate (riskiest) and the risk-free rate whenever these
rates reﬂect the true market clearing prices. We will use EURIBOR as the unsecured lending rate
and EUREPO as the risk-free rate, because only the highest quality collateral (such as government
treasury bills) may be used against loans obtained at this rate.32 Indeed, in Figure 7 the estimated
marginal values for the most part are bounded from above by the EURIBOR rate and from below
by EUREPO. This suggests that the estimates produced by our structural model are reasonable.
In many auctions in the post-turmoil period, however, this relationship fails (see Figure 8). In
particular, as ﬁgure 13 illustrates, there are many auctions that clear at rates that are above the
unsecured rate (EURIBOR), which suggests that this is not the rate at which any bank can borrow!
We use our estimates to ask what convex combination of the secured rate, EUREPO (with
weight αi), and the unsecured rate, EURIBOR (with weight 1−αi), would equal to the estimated
values. For this, we use the (quantity-weighted average) estimates of bid+markup/marginal values.
This hypothetical exercise thus assumes that everyone can get a loan at the reported unsecured
rate, which is unrealistic. Nevertheless, the relative ordering of αi’s is still meaningful: higher α
corresponds to better collateral (marginal values closer to the EUREPO rate) and vice versa. If
EURIBOR was the upper bound for marginal values for every bank, then our estimates of α’s
should lie between 0 and 1; yet we quite often obtain negative values. This suggests that the
unsecured interest rate which would rationalize banks’ marginal value in the primary auction lies
above EURIBOR – the reported unsecured rate – and hence that these banks could not borrow
at this rate.Restricting attention to α ∈ (−1,1) and taking the mean of αi across all bidders pre-
turmoil, we get 0.17, with a median of 0.29. In the post-turmoil period, the average α decreased to
−0.01, and the median to −0.02, which suggests that the average bank did not have usable collateral
in the interbank market, and that many banks could not borrow unsecured at EURIBOR, either.33
32Results are similar if we use the EONIA swap rate instead of the EUREPO.
33 Because the EURIBOR (or its counterpart, LIBOR) also play a crucial role in anchoring most of the consumer
loans, such as mortgages, it is important to understand why this rate may have failed to reﬂect market clearing prices
and the increase in the heterogeneity of funding costs among market participants. The ﬁrst potential explanation is33
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A more interesting ﬁnding obtains, however, when we decompose these changes in the hypo-
thetical collateral structure based on our classiﬁcation of bidders: the ones that we labeled as
ﬁnancially distressed after the turmoil (because of a signiﬁcant increase in marginal values) see a
change in mean αi from 0.18 to −0.02, and the median αi decreases from 0.28 to −0.04. This
suggests that the bidders who we label as signiﬁcantly aﬀected indeed suﬀered from a big hit in the
way that their collateral pool was valued in the secondary market. In fact, the “non-distressed”
bidders’ mean α in fact even increases slightly from 0.466 to 0.474, but the median decreases from
0.18 to 0.10.34
In our second exercise, we abandon the assumption that everybody can get a loan at the
unsecured interest rate and instead directly compare the estimated vi’s and the published secured
and unsecured rates at the time of the auction. We normalize our results by dividing by the
number of auctions (since we have 32 auctions pre-turmoil and 18 post-turmoil). Averaging across
all auctions, we have 156 bidders per auction whose values exceed the unsecured interest rate,
EURIBOR, and 184 whose values fall short of it. We ﬁnd that before turmoil, about 138 bidders
have values higher than the reported EURIBOR, which suggests that even before turmoil not every
bank was able to borrow at the reported unsecured rate. After turmoil, this number increases by
that the EURIBOR is not based on actual transactions, but rather on a survey of a subset of banks: “A representative
panel of banks provide daily quotes of the rate, rounded to two decimal places, that each panel bank believes one
prime bank is quoting to another prime bank for interbank term deposits within the euro zone.” Note that the
EURIBOR is based on the declared beliefs of banks regarding market transactions, and that the rate pertains to
transactions between a selected group of banks with superior credit ratings. Thus, in times of uncertainty, it is likely
that the EURIBOR will not accurately represent the unsecured loan rates available to a large number of non-prime
banks.
A second explanation is that of a market failure in the form of credit rationing attributable to increased informa-
tional asymmetries after the turmoil, as in the model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). We thus might expect rationing
of unsecured loans at the reported rates, with the unfulﬁlled demanders seeking liquidity at the ECB repo auctions
instead. However, the market for unsecured loans may have failed to function for reasons other than informational
asymmetries, especially because credit rationing equilibria typically are diﬃcult to generate quantitatively (Arnold
and Riley, 2008). Brunnermeier (2009), for example, argues that the troubles in the interbank lending market in
2007 are due to the precautionary hoarding by individual banks. He argues that banks funding highly leveraged
investment funds became more worried about these funds drawing on their credit lines. This increased each bank’s
uncertainty about its own liquidity needs. At the same time, banks became more uncertain as to whether they could
rely on the interbank market, because it was not known to what extent other banks faced similar problems. Thus the
supply of liquidity decreased and the demand for liquidity increased at the same time, driving up interbank rates.
However, although this provides an explanation as to why the EURIBOR-EUREPO spreads increased, it does not
explain why the primary auction rate for secured loans exceeded the EURIBOR rate.
34Recall that we were able to classify only 482 bidders (out of the total of 733 identities appearing throughout our
sample). While we have estimated αi for the remaining bidders and estimated their marginal values whenever they
submitted a bid, they did not submit bids both pre- and post-turmoil, and therefore our procedure cannot classify
them. This explains why the reported means of the insigniﬁcantly and signiﬁcantly aﬀected bidders lie above the
overall mean of α across all bidders.34
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almost 40% to 189 bidders per auction! Given that on average there are slightly more than 330
participants in an auction, this means that over 50% of the participating bidders cannot transact
at the published EURIBOR. Again decomposing this increase, we ﬁnd that among the signiﬁcantly
aﬀected bidders, the number of bidders with values higher than EURIBOR increased from 92 to 137,
while for the insigniﬁcantly aﬀected bidders it actually decreased slightly from 34 to 33. Similarly,
the number of bidders whose estimated marginal value falls short of the unsecured rate, vi ≤ u,
drops from 209 pre-turmoil to 138 post-turmoil. This change is due mainly to changes among the
bidders who have been signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the turmoil: there are 158 such bidders per auction
pre-turmoil and only 93 post-turmoil, whereas among the insigniﬁcantly aﬀected bidders the drop
is only from 38 to 34.
We also can compare estimated marginal values with the secured rate in the secondary market,
s (EUREPO). By doing this, we ﬁnd that for over 322 bidders in an auction, vi ≥ s (325 pre-turmoil
and 318 post-turmoil), while for only 18 bidders the reverse is true. This suggests that s indeed
places a lower bound on the marginal value of liquidity obtained in the primary market.
6.4 Cross-country diﬀerences in banks’ marginal values
Our data allows us to identify the country-of-origin for the bidders in our dataset. Although we
are not allowed to report the identities of countries, we can investigate whether banks in diﬀerent
countries in the Euro system were aﬀected diﬀerently by the crisis.
In Figure 14, we plot the mean α values across bidders before and after the crisis by country.
Recall that α is close to 1 if a bidder’s marginal value for ECB loans is close to EUREPO, the
interbank secured interest rate, and close to 0 if the bidder’s marginal value is the EURIBOR,
the interbank unsecured interest rate. An α value that is negative indicates that the bidder has
marginal value above the reported EURIBOR; i.e. the bidder cannot satisfy its funding needs at
the EURIBOR rate.
In the ﬁgure, we see that there is considerable heterogeneity across countries, both pre and
post-crisis. First notice that pre-crisis, some countries’ banks have α values close to 1, while others’
banks have α values close to zero (and, in one case, slightly negative). There is high positive35
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correlation between pre- and post-crisis αs; the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient is 0.9. After the
crisis, α values appear to have declined across the board, with the low α countries’ banks being
pushed into the negative α zone.
Because of non-disclosure requirements, we cannot investigate how country characteristics, es-
pecially attributes of their respective ﬁnancial systems, are correlated with the funding costs of
their banks. However, the exercise above may be instructive, in that α values are quite highly
correlated before and after the crisis: the countries whose banks are likely to suﬀer are those whose
banks had high liquidity funding costs to begin with.


















Figure 14: Pre and Post-Crisis Marginal Values across Euro-zone Countries
6.5 Eﬃciency of the Allocation
Using the estimated marginal values, we can also evaluate whether the allocations implemented
in each auction were eﬃcient. In particular, we can compute the (estimated) surplus from an
allocation in which banks with highest values would be awarded the liquidity and compare this
surplus to the surplus from the actual allocation.
Figure 15 shows that the auction comes close to implementing the eﬃcient allocation both36
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Figure 15: Eﬃciency of Discriminatory Auctions
of Liquidity
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Figure 16: Comparing Auction to Random Allo-
cation
before and after August 2007. This result is perhaps not surprising for the pre-crisis period, since
values seemed to have been very homogeneous and thus even a random allocation of liquidity among
banks would have been close to eﬃcient. In the post-crisis period, on the other hand, the increased
heterogeneity of values implies that which bank obtains liquidity can have important eﬃciency
consequences. Nevertheless, given the amounts involved, the half-a-percentage point loss of surplus
could be very costly if the secondary markets have frictions and hence during a crisis there might be
a reason for policy makers to think about using an auction mechanism which implements an eﬃcient
allocation, such as the Vickrey auction, even at the cost of some potential decline in revenues.
In Figure 16 we compare the surplus resulting from the allocation achieved by the auction
mechanism to a random allocation. It is immediately visible that indeed in the pre-crisis period
there is virtually no diﬀerence, but in the post-crisis period, the auctions play an important role in
allocating liquidity to banks with higher willingness-to-pay and improve upon the random alloca-
tion.
6.6 The determinants of banks’ willingness-to-pay for liquidity
We motivated our model with private values by arguing that banks’ values for liquidity obtained in
the primary market likely are driven to a large extent by the collateral value of each bank’s asset
portfolio and by the private information each bank has about its liquidity position, i.e., its need to37
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satisfy the prescribed reserve requirements. To test these assumptions, we complement our dataset
and our estimates of marginal values with additional detailed bank-level data for a subsample
of banks. In this exercise we use three types of data: (1) data that is common to all banks
and speciﬁc to each tender – the one-week Eurepo rate35; (2) bank-speciﬁc data that is publicly
available, for example bank’s CDS and asset sizes; and (3) non-public bank-speciﬁc data, including
volumes allotted at ECB’s long-term reﬁnancing operations (LTRO), banks’ current accounts with
the national central banks, and reserve requirements.36 Unfortunately, the intersection of banks for
whom there are publicly traded CDSs and banks for whom we have data on reserve requirements
leaves us with only 19 banks to work with.
Let us brieﬂy summarize which eﬀects we expect from each variable included in the analysis
that follows. As mentioned earlier, the one-week Eurepo rate normally sets a ﬂoor for bid rates (if
it is above the minimum bid rate) and marginal values because it measures the cost of “alternative”
funding in the secondary market against highly liquid collateral. Thus this rate sets the common
ﬂoor level for the bids and marginal values for all banks.
The (relative) CDS premium captures the impact of credit risk premia in the inter-bank market;
higher values of this variable should lead to an increase in the bids and marginal values of liquidity
at the central bank auctions.37
Volumes allotted at the LTROs captures the impact of term liquidity funding pressure. With
a liquid interbank lending market, the term-liquidity that a bank receives from the central bank
(LTROs) should have little or no impact on the marginal value for liquidity in the short-term
auction (MRO). However, if the ECB becomes the primary funding source for a bank, then we
might expect a noticeable link between the two auctions. Accordingly, our LTROout it variable
measures the outstanding volume of loans obtained in LTROs that bank i owns in week t (in billion
e).
The reserve deﬁciency is calculated from banks’ current accounts with the national central
35See Piazzesi (2003) for an argument about why it is important to control for the levels of interest rates.
36The source for these data are: ECB (current accounts; bidding data); Reuters (Eurepo rate); and KMV (CDS).
37We use the price of a (5-year) CDS contract on the day before each auction, and deﬁne a relative credit default
swap variable as the bank’s CDS minus the average of all banks’ CDS, in order to remove any possible trends that
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banks: the marginal value of liquidity should increase in the amount that a bank has to accumulate
until the end of the reserve maintenance period.38
Finally, Turmoil is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the post-turmoil period. We also included
interactions of all variables with this dummy.
We estimated Fixed Eﬀects (FE) and Random Eﬀects (RE) Panel Data Models.39 The estimates
for the speciﬁcation with Eurepo 1-week and the alternative interest rate measures as explanatory
variables are reported in Table 5 below.40
The estimates show that the Eurepo 1-week rate does very well at explaining the level of
marginal values before the turmoil. Indeed, because the constant term is insigniﬁcant, our model
predicts highly concentrated bidding before the crisis at rates between the Eurepo 1-week rate and
a level 3 basis points above it. Marginal values increased signiﬁcantly after the crisis. Liquidity
shocks (captured by deﬁciency) have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact on marginal
values only after the crisis. The impact of the outstanding volumes in LTROs is not statistically
signiﬁcant for marginal values either before or after the crisis. Nevertheless, the change in sign on
these coeﬃcients pre- and post-turmoil might suggest that LTROs substitute for MROs before the
38A bank’s reserve deﬁciency varies with unexpected liquidity shocks, which may be driven by unexpected mis-
matches between cash inﬂows and outﬂows from that bank’s accounts; it also may reveal the failure to guarantee a
targeted allotment at a previous auction. The Deﬁciency variable is calculated for each bank i as follows. First:




where Dit is the accumulation of reserves needed to fulﬁll its requirement until the last day of the reserve maintenance
period for bank i on day t. RRi is the daily average reserve requirement of bank i (set by the ECB at the beginning
of each reserve maintenance period) and T is the number of days in the maintenance period; T − t is the number of
days until the end of the reserve maintenance period. If a bank follows a smooth (linear) reserve fulﬁlment path, it
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We use the Deficiency value on the day before the MRO. This is a normalized variable that has a days-in-the-reserve
maintenance period dimension.
39We performed the Breusch-Pagan test (for speciﬁcation (1) in Table 5). The random eﬀects model is not rejected
at the 5% level; however, it is rejected at the 10% level. The results reported in the table suggest that the estimates
from an RE and FE models are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar.
40Since not all banks participate in every auction, we also used a two-step Heckman selection model (Heckman
(1976, 1979)). The estimates obtained with correction for sample selection are very similar to those obtained with
FE and RE and can be obtained upon request.39
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Table 5: Analysis of Marginal Values
Marginal Value













Turmoil 1.53∗∗ 2.28∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗ 1.70∗∗
(0.77) (0.65) (0.67) (0.77)
Deﬁciency 0.000008 0.00017 -0.0001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Deﬁciency*Turmoil 0.0226∗∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
LTROout -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.013
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.01)
LTROout*Turmoil 0.009 0.008 0.01 0.016
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.01)
RCDS 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
RCDS*Turmoil 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0018)
Constant -0.08 -0.04 -0.1 -0.09
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
Observations 690 690 690 690
Random eﬀects 19 19 19
Fixed eﬀects 19
Within R2 0.74
a Speciﬁcations (1)-(3): Bank random eﬀects GLS regression
b Speciﬁcation (4): Bank ﬁxed eﬀects regression
c Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.40
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turmoil, but are a complementary source of liquidity in the post-turmoil period. The credit risk
variable (measured by the relative CDS) is statistically signiﬁcant. A bank with CDS above the
average tends to have higher marginal valuations for liquidity. The liquidity and credit risk factors
seem to only partially capture the increase in the spread between marginal valuations and the
reference rate (Eurepo 1-week) after the crisis, because the turmoil dummy variable is signiﬁcant
even when these variables are added to the regression. These results are robust to changing the
reference rate in the regression, as shown by the diﬀerent speciﬁcations41. We also performed a
Hausman test to check for equality of the coeﬃcient estimates of the RE and FE models. We failed
to reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are equal across the two models (p-value of 0.33).
In order to assess the economic signiﬁcance of the results, we calculated the predicted diﬀerence
between the marginal valuations for two banks under the following assumptions: Eurepo rate 1-
week at its highest in-sample value (4.15%); one bank with CDS diﬀerential at highest in-sample
value (44.64); the other bank at minimum sample value (-30.91); one bank with deﬁciency at highest
in-sample value (21.22 days); the other bank at zero. These assumptions are intended to capture
the hypothetical situations of “good” and “bad” banks in the sample. The FE model predicts a
marginal value of 4.07% for the “good” bank and a marginal value of 5.05% for the “bad” bank,
that is a whole percentage point diﬀerence in short-term funding costs across these two banks.
Note that in relative terms, after the crisis the Eurepo 1-week rate “explains” about 52% of the
marginal valuation, the deﬁciency 9%, the CDS diﬀerential 6%, and the turmoil dummy 33%.
6.7 Estimated marginal values and bank balance sheets
Finally, as a test of the external validity of our marginal valuation estimates utilizes data on balance
sheets of system banks obtained from Bankscope. Most of the bidders in our data set are not pub-
licly traded, thus publicly available information on these institutions is largely limited to quarterly
or sometimes annual ﬁnancial statements that are disclosed by these ﬁrms. Using Bankscope, we
construct measures of return-on-equity (ROE) and return-on-assets (ROA),42 which are standard
performance indicators in the banking literature (Madura (2008)). We also compute the cost-to-
41The same results were obtained when estimating the ﬁxed-eﬀects models with diﬀerent interest rates.
42ROE is deﬁned as net income / average total equity, and ROA is deﬁned as net income / average total assets,
where the averages are taken yearly.41
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income ration (CTI), and net-interest margin (NIM), which are proxies for the proﬁt generation
ability of the bank.43 These widely-used ratios are of course not immune to criticism (ECB (2010)),
but can be constructed for a large number of banks for whom market-based performance measures
(based on traded securities) are not available.
We construct these measures for both the end of 2006, and the end of 2007, which comprise the
endpoints of our auction data set. In Table 6.7, we regress the end-of 2007 performance indicators
on their lagged values in 2006, along with the changes in the banks quantity-weighted average
bids and marginal valuations across the pre- vs. post-crisis periods; i.e. we investigate whether
any of the change in the proﬁtability of the bank from 2006 to 2007 can be explained using our
auction-based measures of the short-term funding costs faced by these banks.
The results (in columns 1,4, 7, and 10) indicate that the change in the bidding behavior of the
banks across the pre- vs. the post-crisis periods in our sample is not signiﬁcantly correlated with the
change in the bank’s performance measure from the end of 2006 to the end of 2007. However, for
ROE and CTI, the change in the marginal valuations do show signiﬁcant correlations. Indeed, when
we include both bids and marginal valuations in the regressions, the change in marginal valuations
are signiﬁcant at 5% for ROE and CTI, and at 10% for ROA. The eﬀects are also economically
signiﬁcant – based on the coeﬃcient estimates, a 1 percentage point (100 basis point) increase in
the bank’s marginal value for liquidity is associated with an 18.8% drop in ROA, 5.6% drop in
ROE, and a 28% increase in CTI. Among the four measures we consider, only the net-interest
margin does not display a signiﬁcant association with the changes in bids or marginal values. One
potential explanation might be that unlike the other three measure the NIM is highly persistent
as evidenced by the high coeﬃcient on the lagged value and high R2, there is therefore very little
residual variation left to explain.
These regressions suggest that not only auction-based measures of short-term funding costs,
which are observable at high-frequency by the ECB, may be an important predictor of bank prof-
itability, but that accounting for the strategic component of the auctions by estimating the marginal
valuations helps provide more accurate predictions. Since bank balance sheets are available only
43CTI is calculated as the ratio of operating expenses to operating revenues; thus a higher CTI proxies for lower
proﬁtability. NIM is the ratio of the net interest income over interest bearing assets.42
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at quarterly or sometimes annual frequencies, this suggests that auction data could be very useful
for policymakers when assessing the health of the ﬁnancial system.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We used an economic model of bidding in the ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations to recover par-
ticipant banks’ marginal valuations for ECB provided short-term loans, which also can be linked
to the banks’ outside funding opportunities in the interbank market. Our econometric approach
allows us to decompose into two main eﬀects the dramatic upward shift in banks’ bids beginning
in August 2007: a “fundamental” eﬀect linked to a genuine increase in the willingness-to-pay for
ECB loans because of dwindling funding opportunities elsewhere, and a “strategic” eﬀect, in which
banks without a shift in their willingness-to-pay best-respond to their competitors’ more aggressive
bidding behavior. We showed that the “strategic” eﬀect is non-negligible: while a na¨ ıve analysis of
bids would indicate that all bidders’ willingness-to-pay for short-term ECB funding increased be-
cause of the subprime crisis, accounting for the strategic eﬀect reveals that one third of the bidders
did not experience such a statistically signiﬁcant shift.
Our results also shed light on the linkages between primary and secondary money market rates,
and the shortcoming of “survey” based market rate reporting. We showed that before August 2007,
participant banks’ marginal valuations were in close agreement with the EUREPO and EURIBOR:
published secured and unsecured lending rates reported based on surveys of money-center banks.
After August 2007, though, we ﬁnd that banks’ marginal valuations and, sometimes their bids for
secured ECB loans, far exceed the EURIBOR. That suggests that a large number of banks were not
able to borrow at published rates. These results together suggest that monitoring primary market
activity may allow policymakers and market observers to gain a more detailed understanding of
the depth of similar ﬁnancial crises.
The primary market activities of banks also allowed us to paint a more disaggregated picture of
the 2007 subprime crisis. We noted that there was considerable heterogeneity in banks’ willingness-
to-pay for ECB loans across diﬀerent Eurozone countries. Perhaps more signiﬁcantly, banks from
member countries that relied less on ECB funding before August 2007 appear to have suﬀered less43
ECB





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1374
August 2011
from the crisis. Our estimates for the short-term funding costs of the banks during the crisis also
survive a number of external validity checks: the estimated funding costs are bounded between
published collateralized and uncollateralized rates in the “pre-crisis” period, even though this is
not imposed by our estimation exercise. Moreover, for a small subsample of banks for whom credit
default swaps are traded, we also noted a signiﬁcant correlation between the bank’s estimated
short-term funding cost, and its creditworthiness (as measured by its CDS price) that potentially
could be monitored as the leading indicators for distress in crisis situations. This ﬁndings suggest
that our method of measuring short-term funding costs of Euro-system banks may be useful in
constructing high-frequency bank-speciﬁc indicators of ﬁnancial distress.
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A.1 Institutional Background
A.1.1 Objectives and Tools of the ECB
The operational framework for monetary policy implementation by the ECB has three main ob-
jectives: signalling of the monetary policy stance, steering of very short-term interest rates, and
provision of reﬁnancing to the banking system in an eﬃcient way and under all circumstances.
The ECB has three main tools to implement its objectives: minimum reserve requirements with
averaging provision, standing facilities, and open market operations. The main focus of this paper
is on open market operations, but below we brieﬂy describe each of the three components because
all are quite relevant for banks’ behavior in the open market operations .
Reserve requirements have two main functions. They contribute to stabilise money market
interest rates and enlarge the structural liquidity shortage of the banking system. Euro area
banks have to keep minimum reserves (current accounts with national central banks44). They
are computed on a lagged accounting basis by applying a reserve ratio (currently at 2%) to the
reserve base. The reserve base includes short-term liabilities of banks (deposits and debt securities
with maturity below or equal to two years). Reserves must be kept on average over a maintenance
period (averaging mechanism) which has approximately one month duration. Required reserves are
remunerated - at a rate linked to the marginal rate of the Main Reﬁnancing Operations (MROs)
described below. Current account holdings beyond the minimum requirement are not remunerated
(excess reserves).
There are two types of standing facilities, one providing liquidity (against collateral), which is
a marginal lending facility and another, absorbing liquidity, which is a deposit facility. Both are
overnight facilities taken at the discretion of the banks, and, in general, there are no limits set by
the ECB to their recourses by banks. Standing facilities have penalty rates: marginal lending +100
basis points above the Minimum Bid Rate (henceforth MBR, which is a policy rate, see below for
more details) and deposit facility -100 basis points below the MBR.45 These two rates set a corridor
for the interbank market overnight interest rate.
44National Central Banks
45The interest rate corridor was narrowed to ±50 basis points as of October 9, 2008.
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There are three main types of open market operations. The Main Reﬁnancing Operations
(MROs), which are the main focus of our analysis, The Longer Term Reﬁnancing Operations
(LTROs) are liquidity providing reverse transactions, with three-month maturity, conducted once a
month, every month. The main function of the LTROs is to provide additional longer-term liquidity
to the market. They are not intended to signal the (future) stance of monetary policy. Fine Tuning
Operations (FTOs) provide or absorb liquidity. They have neither ﬁxed frequency nor maturity.
Provision of liquidity is made via reverse transactions or foreign exchange swaps, and absorption of
liquidity is normally achieved via collection of ﬁxed term deposits or foreign exchange swaps. The
main function of the FTOs is to smooth the eﬀects on interest rates caused by unexpected liquidity
ﬂuctuations in the market. Since 2005 the ECB conducts (almost) systematically an FTO on the
last day of each reserve maintenance period.
A.1.2 More Details on the Main Reﬁnancing Operations
MROs are executed weekly according to an indicative calendar published by the Eurosystem. Nor-
mally, the announcement of the operation is on Monday46, the execution on Tuesday47 and set-
tlement on Wednesday. On the announcement day (Monday) the ECB publishes an estimate of
the average autonomous factors48 from the announcement day until the maturity of the operation
(9 days ahead forecast) as well as the benchmark allotment. On the execution day (Tuesday) the
ECB publishes a revised estimate of the average autonomous factors and benchmark amount.
As we mentioned earlier, a bid may consist of up to ten interest rates and associated quantities
a bank is willing to transact with the ECB. The interest rate bid must be expressed as multiples
of a basis point, i.e., of 0.01 percentage points. The minimum bid amount is EUR 1,000,000. Bids
exceeding this amount must be expressed as multiples of EUR 100,000. The ECB may impose a
maximum bid limit in order to prevent disproportionately large bids.
In the allotment, bids are listed in descending order of oﬀered interest rates. Bids with the
46Info in Reuters page ECB16.
47Info in Reuters page ECB17.
48Deﬁned as Autonomous factors (AF) = Net Foreign Assets (NFA) + Net Assets Denominated in Euro (NDA) -
Banknotes (BN) - Government deposits (GOV) - Other (O).50
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highest interest rate levels are satisﬁed ﬁrst and subsequently bids with successively lower interest
rates are accepted until the total liquidity to be allotted is exhausted. If at the lowest interest rate
level accepted (i.e., the marginal interest rate), the aggregate amount bid exceeds the remaining
amount to be allotted, the remaining amount is allocated pro rata among the bids according to the
ratio of the remaining amount to be allotted to the total amount bid at the marginal interest rate
(a.k.a. rationining rule pro-rata on-the-margin). The amount allotted to each bank is rounded to
the nearest euro.
The ECB may apply either single rate (uniform price) or multiple rate (discriminatory) auction
procedures. So far only the latter has been used, and thus our data includes only discriminatory
auctions. In a discriminatory auction, the allotment interest rate is equal to the interest rate oﬀered
by each individual bid. Since October 15 2008 the weekly main reﬁnancing operations have been
carried out with a ﬁxed-rate tender procedure with full allotment.
A.1.3 Collateral (Eligible Assets)
All Eurosystem liquidity-providing operations (including marginal lending and intraday credit) are
based on underlying assets that must fulﬁll certain criteria in order to be eligible. A European
credit assessment framework (ECAF) has been set up in order to evaluate the eligible collateral.
The collateral accepted by the Eurosystem is very broad. Two types of assets are included in the
list: marketable and non-marketable. The ECB publishes daily a list of eligible marketable assets
on its website.49 Marketable assets must be debt instruments meeting high credit standards which
are assessed by the ECAF rules. The issuers can be central banks, public sector, private sector,
and international institutions; the place of issue must be EEA50, the place of establishment of the
issuer must be the EEA and non-EEA G10 countries, the currency must be EUR.51 Both regulated
and non-regulated markets are considered; the latter must be, however, accepted by the ECB. Non-
marketable assets are credit claims and Retail Mortgage Backed Debt Instruments (RMBD). For
credit claims the debtor/guarantor must meet high credit standards which are assessed by the ECAF
49Eligible assets are listed at: https://mfi-assets.ecb.int/dla_EA.htm
50European Economic Area
51Since November 14, 2008 the list of eligible marketable debt instruments was enlarged to include instruments
denominated in US dollar, yen and sterling, issued by EEA issuers.51
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rules. The debtor/guarantor can be public sector, non-ﬁnancial corporations, and international
institutions; the place of establishment of the debtor/guarantor must be the euro area and the
currency must be EUR. Minimum size rules apply. For RMBD the asset must meet high credit
standards which are assessed by the ECAF rules. The issuers can be credit institutions; the place
of establishment of the issuer must be the euro area, and the currency must be EUR. A bank may
not submit as collateral any asset issued or guaranteed by itself or by any other entity with which
it has close links.
In the assessment of credit standard of eligible assets the Eurosystem takes into account the
following sources: external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs), national central banks in-house
credit assessment systems (ICAS exist in Deutsche Bundesbank, Banco de Espa˜ na, Banque de
France and Oesterreichische Nationalbank), counterparties internal ratings-based systems (IRB) or
third-party providers rating tools. The Eurosystems credit quality threshold is deﬁned in terms
of a “single A” credit assessment (meaning “A-” by Fitch or S&P; or “A3” by Moody).52 The
Eurosystem considers a probability of default (PD) over a one-year horizon of 0.10% as equivalent
to a “single A” credit assessment. Prudential information can be used by the Eurosystem as a basis
for rejecting assets. In countries, in which RMBDs are mobilised, the respective national central
bank must implement a credit assessment framework for this type of asset. The performance of
the credit assessment systems is reviewed annualy. It consists of an ex post comparison of the
observed default rate for the set of all eligible debtors and the credit quality threshold deﬁned by
the benchmark PD.
Risk control measures are applied to protect the Eurosystem against the risk of a ﬁnancial
loss if underlying assets have to be realised owing to the default of a counterparty. The following
measures are applied: i) valuation haircuts (increasing with the maturity and illiquidity of the
asset); ii) margin calls (i.e. marking to market): if the value of the underlying collateral falls below
a certain level the national central bank will require the counterparty to supply additional assets or
cash. The Eurosystem may apply limits to the exposure vis-a-vis issuers/debtors or guarantors and
may exclude certain assets from use in its monetary policy operations. The last two are, however,
52As of October 25 2008 and until December 2009 the ECB lowered the threshold to BBB- (except for asset-backed
securities, which were still A-).52
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currently not applied.53
In pooling systems the counterparty makes a pool of suﬃcient underlying assets available to
the national central bank to cover the related credits thus implying that individual assets are not
linked to speciﬁc credit operations. In an earmarking system each credit operation is linked to
speciﬁc identiﬁable assets. Assets are subject to daily valuation.
A.2 Model of Bidding in the Primary Market for Liquidity
The basic model underlying our analysis is based on the share auction model of Wilson (1979) with
private information, in which both quantity and price are assumed to be continuous.54 In summary,
there are N (potential) bidders, who are bidding for a share of a perfectly divisible good. Q denotes
the amount of liquidity oﬀered for sale by the central bank, i.e., the good to be divided between the
bidders. Q is itself a random variable since the ECB augments the supply based on current situation
after the bids have been submitted. We assume that the distribution of Q is common knowledge
among the bidders. Furthermore, the number of potential bidders participating in an auction, N,
is also commonly known. This assumption is reasonable in the context of our empirical application
as all participants have to register with the auctioneer before the auction and the list of registered
participants is publicly available. Each bidder receives a private (possibly multidimensional) signal,
θi, which is the only private information about the underlying value of the auctioned goods. The
joint distribution of the signals will be denoted by F (θ1,...,θN). We assume independent private
values (IPV) paradigm.55 In this case the θi’s are distributed independently across bidders, and
bidders’ values do not depend on private information of other bidders, i.e., the marginal valuation
function has the form vi (q,θi).
53Additional haircuts will be applied to all newly eligible marketable assets.
54Since the main goal of this article is not to provide tools and methodology for estimating this type of models,
we refer the reader to our earlier work for more detailed discussion and analysis. The discriminatory auction version
of Wilson’s model with private values has been studied in Horta¸ csu (2002a) in the context of Turkish treasury bill
auctions. Kastl (2006 and 2008) extends this model to an empirically relevant setting, in which bidders are restricted
to use step functions with limited number of steps as their bidding strategies. The estimation of this extended model
(which is also utilized in this paper) and the relevant asymptotic behavior of the resulting estimates are described in
detail in Horta¸ csu and Kastl (2008). Several related theoretical papers on divisible good auctions, such as Ausubel
and Cramton (2002), Back and Zender (1993) or Wang and Zender (2002) focus on properties of equilibria.
55Bindseil, Nyborg and Strebulaev (2005) provide some econometric evidence that private values might be appro-
priate in case of repo auctions.53
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Assumption 1 Bidder i’s signal θi is drawn from a common support [0,1]
M,w h e r eM = dim(θi),
according to an atomless marginal d.f. Fi (θi).
Assumption 2 vi (q,θi) is measurable and bounded, strictly increasing in (each component of) θi
∀q and weakly decreasing in q ∀θi.
Vi (q,θi) denotes the gross utility: Vi (q,θi)=
  q
0 vi (u,θi)du. Bidders’ pure strategies are
mappings from private signals to bid functions: σi :Θ i →Y. Since in most divisible good auctions
in practice, including the liquidity auctions of the ECB, the bidders’ choice of bidding strategies is
restricted to non-increasing step functions with an upper bound on the number of steps, K = 10,
we impose the following assumption:












=d i m(   q)=Ki ∈{ 0,...,10},








Therefore the set Y includes all non-decreasing step functions with at most 10 steps, y : R+ →
[0,Q], where yi (p)=
 K
k=1 qikI (p ∈ (bik+1,b ik]) where I is an indicator function. A bid function
for type θi speciﬁes for each price p,h o wb i gas h a r eyi (p|θi) of the securities oﬀered in the auction
(type θi of) bidder i demands.
Finally, since bidders use step functions, a situation may arise in which multiple prices would
clear the market. If that is the case, we assume consistently with our application that the auctioneer
selects the most favorable price from his perspective, i.e., the highest price.




: TD(p)=Q,t h e nPc =m a x p {p : TD(p)=Q},
where TD(p) denotes total demand at price p.
Because bidders’ strategies are step functions, the residual supply will be a step function and
hence but for knife-edge cases any equilibrium will involve rationing with probability one. Con-
sistently with our application, we only consider the rationing rule pro-rata on-the-margin, under
which the auctioneer proportionally adjusts the marginal bids so as to equate supply and demand.54
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Assumption 5 The rationing rule employed is pro-rata on-the-margin, under which the rationing
coeﬃcient satisﬁes
R(Pc)=
Q − TD+ (Pc)
TD(Pc) − TD+ (Pc)
where Pc is the market clearing price, TD(Pc) denotes total demand at price Pc, and TD+ (Pc)=
limp↓P c TD(p). Only the bids exactly at the market clearing price are adjusted.
These last two assumptions, which are both consistent with our application, make sure that no
bidder would prefer to tie with another bidder when gaining strictly positive marginal surplus at
the quantity allocated after rationing.
Our solution concept is Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. The expected utility of type θi of bidder
i w h oe m p l o y sas t r a t e g yyi(·|θi) in a discriminatory auction given that other bidders are using













i (Q,θ,y(·|θ)) >q k)(qk − qk−1)bk
−
 K
k=1 1(qk ≥ qc
i (Q,θ,y(·|θ)) >q k−1)(qc








i (Q,θ,y(·|θ)) is the (market clearing) quantity bidder i obtains if the state (bidders’ private
information and the supply quantity) is (θ,Q) and bidders bid according to strategies speciﬁed in
the vector y(·|θ)=[ y1 (·|θ1),...,yN (·|θN)], and similarly Pc (Q,s,y(·|θ)) will denote the market
clearing price associated with state (θ,Q), which turns out to be the random variable that is most
crucial to the analysis. The ﬁrst term in (A-1) is the gross utility the type θi enjoys from his
allocation, the second term is the total payment for all units allocated at steps at which the type
θi was not rationed and the ﬁnal term is the payment for units allocated during rationing. A
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in this setting is thus a collection of functions such that almost every
type θi of bidder i is choosing his bid function so as to maximize his expected utility: yi (·|θi) ∈
argmaxEUi (θi) for a.e. θi and all bidders i. Part (i) of the following proposition proved in
Kastl (2008) provides necessary conditions characterizing the equilibrium in discriminatory auctions
with private values when marginal valuation function is continuous in q. Since continuity of the55
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marginal valuation function might be questionable at the last step (in particular for bidders who
submit just one step), we make use of the necessary conditions for optimality with respect to the
bid (part (ii)).
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1-5 in any Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of a Discriminatory
Auction, for almost all θi,w i t hab i d d e ro ft y p eθi submitting Ki (θi) ≤ 10 steps, every step k in
the equilibrium bid function yi (·|θi) has to satisfy:
(i) ∀k<K i (θi) such that v(q,θi) is continuous in a neighborhood of qk for a.e. θi:
v (qk,θ i)=bk +
Pr(bk+1 ≥ Pc)
Pr(bk >Pc >b k+1)
(bk − bk+1)( A - 2 )
and at Ki (θi):
bK = v(q,θi)
where q =s u p (Q,θ−i) qc
i (Q,θ,y(·|θ)), i.e., the largest quantity allocated to bidder i in equilibrium.
(ii) ∀k ≤ Ki (θi) such that v(q,θi) is a step function in q at step k such that v(q,θi)=vk ∀q ∈
(qk−1,q k] for a.e. θi and signals are independently distributed:





In practice, we use equation (A-2) to identify the marginal values at all but last step, and we
use equation (A-3) at the last step.56 Note that as K →∞ , (A-2) and (A-3) coincide in the limit.57
A.3 Liquidity demand and supply
To put the liquidity auctions of the ECB into perspective and understand the supply policy of the
ECB, let us ﬁrst look at the simpliﬁed balance sheet of the Eurosystem, for example on June 29,
2007 (Table 7 and Table 8).
On the Liabilities side the main items are Banknotes and Current Accounts (together represent
56Using (A-3) at all steps leads to qualitatively very similar results, but the estimates turn out to be less precise
due to the necessity to numerically estimate the derivative of the distribution of the market clearing price.
57The formal argument is in Kastl (2008).56
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Table 7: Balance sheet of the Eurosystem on June 29, 2007
Assets Liabilities
1. Net Foreign Assets 325,703 5. Banknotes 630,777
2. Net Assets Denominated in EUR 282,041 6. Current Accounts 194,530
3. Liquidity Providing Open Market Operations 463,501 7. Government Deposits 69,621
4. Marginal Lending Facility 5 8. Deposit Facility 80
9. Other 176,242
Total Assets 1,071,250 Total Liabilities 1,071,250
* Values in million EUR.
Table 8: Structure of the balance sheet of the Eurosystem on June 29, 2007
Assets % Liabilities %
1. Net Foreign Assets 30 5. Banknotes 59
2. Net Assets Denominated in EUR 26 6. Current Accounts 18
3. Liquidity Providing Open Market Operations 43 7. Government Deposits 6
4. Marginal Lending Facility 0 8. Deposit Facility 0
9. Other 16
Total Assets 100 Total Liabilities 100
77% of total Liabilities), the latter including the minimum reserve requirement. On the Assets side
there are two large items: Net Foreign Assets and Net Assets Denominated in Euro (representing
56% of total Assets). The former relates to foreign exchange reserve holdings of the Eurosystem
(in gold and US Dollar) managed by the ECB. The latter reﬂects the investment portfolio holdings
of national central banks (managed in a decentralised manner according to agreed rules). It is
important to note that this is not a monetary policy portfolio. Liquidity providing OMO represent
43% of the Assets of the Eurosystem. This is the item that is adjusted/managed by the ECB and
relevant for monetary policy implementation.
The liquidity needs of the banking system can be calculated from the balance sheet as follows:
+ Assets (other than 3 and 4) provide liquidity
- Liabilities (other than 8) create liquidity needs.
Thus:
Liquidity Deﬁcit = Autonomous factors (AF) + Current Accounts (CA).
Where:57
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Autonomous factors (AF) = Net Foreign Assets (NFA) + Net Assets Denominated in Euro (NDA)
- Banknotes (BN) - Government deposits (GOV) - Other (O).
Current Accounts include the reserve requirement (RR) plus very small excess reserves (XR).
Example 1 From the balance sheet data (Table 7) we can see that AF = -268,896 million EUR,
and CA = -194,530 million EUR. Therefore the aggregate liquidity deﬁcit in the euro area was
AF+CA=-463,426 million EUR or approximately 463 billion EUR, of which 58% was due to the
so-called autonomous factors and 42% was due to the reserve requirement (current accounts).
Alternatively one could express the liquidity needs as follows (Table 9): Outright portfolio - Re-
serve Base - Other = -463,426 million EUR, where Reserve Base = Banknotes + Current Accounts
and Outright Portfolio = NFA + NDA - GOV.
Table 9: Simpliﬁed balance sheet of the Eurosystem on June 29, 2007
Assets % Liabilities %
1. Outright Portfolio 538,125 3. Reserve Base 825,307
2. Repo Operations 463,501 4. Net Standing Facilities 75
5. Other 176,242
Total Assets 1,001,624 Total Liabilities 1,001,624
* Values in million EUR.
As shown in Table 7 (also Table 9) the ECB provides liquidity to the banking system mainly
via its regular open market operations, which satisfy: 58
O M O+M L-D F=A F+C A .A n dO M O=M R O+L T R O .
Before the turmoil the MROs represented about 70% of the reﬁnancing and the LTROs only
30%. Thus, the bulk of the liquidity was provided by MROs on a short-term basis (weekly) and was
rolled-over every week. For example, on June 29, 2007, the outstanding volumes in OMO consisted
of: (i) Main reﬁnancing operations (MROs: 313,499 million EUR) and (ii) Longer-term reﬁnancing
operations (LTROs: 150,002 million EUR).
In general, the liquidity policy of the ECB is quantity-oriented even if the objective is to steer
the overnight interest rate. It is a rules-based approach where the benchmark allotment plays a
central role.
58The provision of liquidity via the marginal lending facility is negligible.58
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The benchmark allotment in a MRO is the allotment amount which allows counterparties to
smoothly fulﬁll their reserve requirements until the day before the settlement of the next MRO,
when taking into account the following liquidity needs:
• Liquidity imbalances that have occurred previously in the same reserve maintenance period
and which were not anticipated in the preceding MRO
• ECB’s forecast of the autonomous factors
• ECB’s forecast of excess reserves which are assumed to be the same on each day of the reserve
maintenance period
The weekly benchmark allotment is (in simpliﬁed terms) given by:
MRObenchmark = AFforecast+ RR + XRforecast+ {Forecast error of previous week}
Assuming: ML−DF = 0. The reserve requirement is ﬁxed as it is calculated on a lagged accounting
basis.
The underlying idea of the benchmark allotment is that if the ECB’s forecast errors are unbiased
and the forecast error variance is small compared to the reserve requirement, then the overnight
rate on the last day in the reserve maintenance period should be expected to be close to the middle
of the interest rate corridor deﬁned by the rates on the standing facilities. With a symmetric
interest rate corridor this policy should keep the overnight rate close to the policy rate.
In fact, on the last day of the reserve maintenance period we get the aggregate liquidity im-
balance equal to the forecast error made by the ECB, the former being either a net recourse to
marginal lending (liquidity shortage) or to the deposit facility (liquidity surplus).
ML− DF = Forecast Error
.
If the overnight rate is expected to be close to the policy rate on the last day of the RMP, then
on any other day in the reserve maintenance period it should also be close to the policy rate by
applying the martingale hypothesis.59
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Empirical evidence before the turmoil matches these predictions very closely (ﬁgure 20).
Figure 21 shows that the liquidity needs of the banking system evolved very smoothly before
the turmoil between 400 and 450 billion EUR. The MROs had a volume of around 300 billion
EUR and the LTROs about 100-150 billion EUR. Deviations from benchmark were negligible as
illustrated in ﬁgure 22.
Figure 21 further illustrates how the ECB managed liquidity during the turmoil. Four aspects
are shown: i) the total volume of reﬁnancing was kept on trend, albeit with somewhat more
volatility; there was a signiﬁcant increase at the end of the year mainly for seasonal reasons; ii)
there was an increase in the absolute volume and relative weight of LTROs in total reﬁnancing.
However, the volume of MROs declined so that the total volume was kept on trend; iii) the ECB
conducted more frequent and sizable ﬁne-tuning operations (FTOs), both providing and draining
liquidity; the latter (draining) were more frequent and sizable; A ﬁnal aspect is illustrated in
ﬁgure 22: iv) At the MROs deviations from benchmark became very sizable and time-varying
(larger at the ﬁrst MRO in the RMP and somewhat smaller in subsequent MROs in the same
RMP).60
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A.4 Long Term Reﬁnancing Operations
We also obtained data on ECB’s LTROs. We have 19 auctions covering 10/2006 to 3/2008. As
described in the institutional background, these auctions are run only once a month and they are
for loans with 3-months maturity. These data are summarized in table 10 and the pre- and post-
turmoil means and standard deviation in table 11. The patterns in general correspond to those from
the main reﬁnancing operations studied in the main body of this paper. The important diﬀerences
are (i) the much starker increase the price bid spread against the EONIA rate following the turmoil
(from 1 to 47 basis points) which is about ﬁve times the increase in the MROs and (ii) the number
of participants is less than a half of those in MROs. This is probably mainly due to the overlapping
maturities of the loans (monthly auction frequency and 3-month maturity) since the set of banks
participating in both types of reﬁnancing operations is very similar. This last observation allows
us to perform the same exercise as in the case of MROs and use the estimated values to classify
bidders into more and less distressed groups. Doing so, we obtain a similar pattern as in the MROs:
only about 2
3 of bidders experienced an increase in their mean (quantity-weighted) marginal value,
while almost all banks signiﬁcantly increased their bid spreads against EONIA suggesting more
aggressive bidding strategy.
Table 10: Data Summary - LTROs
Summary Statistics
Auctions 19
Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Bidders 148 19 96 175
Submitted steps 2.29 1.68 1 10
Price bid 4.20 0.44 3.20 5.05
Price bid spreada 0.26 0.26 -0.48 1.02
Quantity bid 0.01 0.02 1 ∗ 10
−5 0.28
Issued Amount (billions e) 49.74 8.58 40 75
a Spread against EONIA rate.
Following the same procedure as in MROs, we estimated the marginal values that would ratio-
nalize the observed bids in LTROs. We also repeated the same exercise as in the case of MROs to
classify the bidders in LTROs into the distressed and not distressed groups. The results are sum-
marized in table 12. Due to less participation frequency (we have only 11 auction pre-turmoil and61
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Before After Before After
Bidders 150.6 143.4 10.66 26.53
Submitted steps 1.76 3.04 0.94 2.15
Price bid 3.78 4.55 0.26 0.16
Price bid spreada 0.01 0.47 0.02 0.17
Quantity bid 0.009 0.013 0.024 0.023
Issued Amount (billion e) 46.36 54.38 5.05 9.82
a Spread against EONIA rate.
8 auctions post-turmoil) we were able to classify only 200 bidder identities. Very similar pattern
arises for those, however, as in the case of MROs. Virtually all participants signiﬁcantly increased
their bids, but for 49
189 (or 26%) of those, this does not seem to have been accompanied by an
increase in values.
Table 12: Predicting Poten-
tial Problems - LTROs
Based on Bids
Yes No
Values Yes 140 4
No 49 762
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Empirical CDF of the number of bidsteps
Before Turmoil
After Turmoil
Figure 17: Distribution of the number of steps in a bid before and after the turmoil












# of Auctions in which a Bidder Participated
Histogram of participation frequency of bidders with large coefficients on turmoil dummy
Figure 18: Histogram of Participation by Bidders
with Large Signiﬁcant Turmoil Eﬀects








Histogram of participation frequency of bidders with insignificant coefficients on turmoil dummy
# of Auctions in which a Bidder Participated
Figure 19: Histogram of Participation by Bidders
with Insigniﬁcant Turmoil Eﬀects63
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Figure 20: EONIA Spread and Liquidity Condi-
tions on the Last Day of the RMP
Figure 21: Liquidity Provision by the ECB in
2007
Figure 22: Deviation from Benchmark at the MROs in 2007Working PaPer SerieS
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